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 European governments are struggling with the biggest refugee crisis since World War II, but there exists little
evidence regarding how the management of the asylum process affects the subsequent integration of refugees
in the host country. We provide new causal evidence about how one central policy parameter, the length of
time that refugees wait in limbo for a decision on their asylum claim, affects their subsequent economic inte-
gration. Exploiting exogenous variation in wait times and registry panel data covering refugees who applied in
Switzerland between 1994 and 2004, we find that one additional year of waiting reduces the subsequent em-
ployment rate by 4 to 5 percentage points, a 16 to 23% drop compared to the average rate. This deleterious
effect is remarkably stable across different subgroups of refugees stratified by gender, origin, age at arrival, and
assigned language region, a pattern consistent with the idea that waiting in limbo dampens refugee employment
through psychological discouragement, rather than a skill atrophy mechanism. Overall, our results suggest that
marginally reducing the asylum waiting period can help reduce public expenditures and unlock the economic
potential of refugees by increasing employment among this vulnerable population.ttp://INTRODUCTION o
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ag.org/There is a distressing refugee crisis taking place throughout the world.
As people flee civil war, state failure, disease, natural disasters, and
poverty, refugee-receiving countries are faced with an urgent and fun-
damental challenge: how best to integrate the massive number of asy-
lum seekers who have been granted some form of refugee status,
totaling 14.3 million in 2014 (1). In 2014 alone, Europe received more
than 700,000 new asylum claims, a 47% increase compared to 2013 (2),
and the crisis shows no signs of abating. In 2015, more than 1 million
new asylum applications were lodged in Europe, and more than 3700
asylum seekers were reported dead or missing on the journey (3, 4).
Asylum seekers are trapped along a path of despair: fleeing horrific
circumstances at home, undertaking a perilous and often deadly jour-
ney, and then ultimately being met with resistance and exclusion in
the resettlement process. The massive influx of asylum seekers has
resulted in political conflict in many receiving countries and increas-
ingly violent native backlash against migrants including mass demon-
strations, hate crimes, and even arson attacks on asylum housing
facilities (5, 6). Successfully integrating refugees can help curb this ris-
ing native backlash seen throughout Europe, while also unleashing the
full economic potential of the diverse skills among accepted refu-
gees, most of whom remain in the host country for good (7). To
be clear, refugee integration has been a long-standing and pressing
issue in many European countries with large refugee populations, such
as Switzerland (8, 9), and the current crisis exacerbates this major on-
going problem.
In the context of this crisis, receiving countries have a unique op-
portunity to alter the management of how asylum seekers are received
and perhaps, most importantly, the policies that determine how longthey have to wait to begin their new lives in the host country (10). The
rules of the Dublin Regulation, which apply to European Union mem-
ber states and cosignatories such as Switzerland, demand that asylum
seekers be temporarily housed somewhere in the responsible country
of arrival while they wait for a decision on their asylum claim. During
this waiting period, the asylum seekers find themselves in a legal and
social limbo in which their lives are essentially put on hold, and they
operate under the threat of deportation in the case that their asylum
claim is denied. Asylum seekers typically live isolated from the native
population in an assigned reception center or in collective accommo-
dation. They typically receive welfare support and face some restric-
tions on travel and employment, and there is an expectation that
many of them will be deported (10–13). For many, this idle waiting
period lasts for years until either their claim is denied and they are
sent back or their claim is approved and they are granted some form
of refugee status that protects them from deportation and provides
temporary legal residency in the host country. The receipt of this
new status marks a crucial transition point for asylum seekers, because
they are now officially regarded as protected refugees, and state autho-
rities expect that they will rapidly integrate into the host country and
make their own living.
How does the length of the period during which asylum seekers
are forced to wait for their asylum decision affect the subsequent in-
tegration and success of refugees in what will become their adoptive
homes? Does being forced to wait longer dampen the chances that
refugees will find employment and successfully navigate the difficult
transition from a life in limbo to becoming productive participants
in the host country economy? There are theoretical reasons to expect
that longer waiting periods can act as an important impediment to
subsequent integration. Psychological stress can arise when individuals
face a threat to their resources or investment (14), de facto un-
employment during waiting periods can lead to depression and dis-
empowerment (15–17), and continuous uncertainty can compound
the trauma already experienced by many refugees (18, 19). In addition,1 of 7
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 economic theory suggests that time out of the labor market will cause
skills to atrophy, and therefore, long-term unemployed asylum seekers
will face steep barriers to reentering the labor market (20).
There is a significant body of literature emphasizing the impor-
tance of the postmigration experience as it relates to refugee integra-
tion. First, several important studies have documented the economic,
social, health, and psychological issues among refugees in European
and other host countries (21–27). In Switzerland specifically, asylum
seekers have been shown to have high levels of psychiatric disorders
(28). Second, and more specific to this particular research question,
there is also a large body of in-depth qualitative work illuminating
the multitude of issues and challenges that arise from the uncertainty
faced by asylum seekers and refugees while living in limbo (29–34).
Recounting her family’s experience waiting, an asylum seeker in Switz-
erland captures some of the specific challenges of an uncertain future
that these studies highlight: “We came here and my husband had high
hopes; he thought he could find work here… five years living in real
uncertainty, we didn’t know what was going to happen with us…. I can
see the same with many other men, that they become a mess, and then
their marriage and family and everything [falls apart]” (19). Another
asylum seeker, a young Afghan in Sweden, pointedly captures the
waiting process: “Even in prison they operate with a time limit! ‘This
is when you are going to be free,’ they’ll tell you. But here they only tell
you to wait, just wait…” (34).
Despite the immediate policy relevance of the issue and substantial
qualitative evidence as to the hardships asylum seekers face during
lengthy asylum procedures, it remains unknown how longer wait times
causally affect the integration of refugees into receiving countries.
The aforementioned studies are mostly descriptive and typically based
on small-N qualitative interviews and occasional quantitative cross-
sectional studies that are not designed to isolate the causal effects of spe-
cific asylum policies on refugee integration. This lack of causal evidence
reflects the inherent difficulties in gathering large-scale high-quality
panel data on the diverse and vulnerable refugee population that needs
to be paired with details about the asylum process and integration out-
comes to lend itself to a causal identification strategy.
Our contribution fills this gap by providing new causal evidence
that isolates and quantifies the effect of the length of the wait time
for the asylum decision on the subsequent employment of refugees
who have been granted subsidiary protection in the major receiving
country Switzerland. Switzerland is one of the top destination coun-
tries in Europe both in terms of stock of refugees and in terms of the
number of new asylum seekers, and the composition of its refugee and
asylum-seeking population is similar to that of other important receiv-
ing countries in Europe (see figs. S1 to S3).
Our quantity of interest is the effect of the length of the waiting
period on the probability that refugees are employed in the year after
they receive refugee status with subsidiary protection. The waiting pe-
riod is measured as the number of days it took from the submission of
the asylum application to a positive decision granting subsidiary pro-
tection. During their waiting period, asylum seekers are housed in ac-
commodations in a randomly assigned Swiss canton and they are not
allowed to leave this canton. They are allowed to work while waiting
but face restrictions in some cantons in the sense that they can only
take jobs after a mandatory waiting period of 3 to 6 months, and em-
ployers have to demonstrate that no Swiss native or permanent resi-
dent can be found for a given job, and in addition, some cantons
restrict employment to only specific permissible industries. These re-Hainmueller, Hangartner, Lawrence Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600432 3 August 2016strictions for labor market access of asylum seekers are common in
other European countries (see table S1).RESULTS
Effect of waiting period on refugee employment
We draw upon unique register panel data that track all individuals
who applied for asylum in Switzerland between 1994 and 2004 and
were subsequently granted the status of subsidiary protection within
5 years of arrival (n = 17,360). The data are not self-reported but based
on the processing records of the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM)
that centrally decides all the asylum claims. On average, refugees in
our sample waited 665 days for their asylum decision with an SD of
478 days (see table S2 for summary statistics).
To identify the causal effect of waiting, we exploit the large quasi-
random variation in wait times that results from the batch processing
of the asylum claims by the Swiss SEM. A detailed description of the
causal identification strategy is provided in Materials and Methods.
Table 1 shows themain regression result that longer waiting periods
considerably lower subsequent employment. Model 1 suggests that,
controlling for week of entry, origin, religion, quarters of residency, eth-
nicity, assigned canton, age, and gender, being forced to wait one addi-
tional year for the asylum decision lowers the probability of being
employed by about 4.9 percentage points (two-tailed, P < 0.00004). This
is a large effect that corresponds to about a 23% drop compared to the
average employment rate, which is about 21% (see the last row of Table
1). Model 2 shows that the effect is somewhat smaller, but still substan-
tively significant, at about 3.4 percentage points (two-tailed, P < 0.018)
or 16% compared to the average employment rate, when we add the
origin × week of entry fixed effects and only use variation in the day
of arrival within the same origin and week.
How robust are these findings? One concern might be that there re-
mains an unobserved characteristic that strongly correlates with wait
times and subsequent employment. Maybe even among refugees who
arrive in the same week and are similar on all covariates, those with
higher ability somehow get faster decisions and are more likely to find
work. If refugees who are similar to our controls still differ on an un-
observed confounder such as ability, then we would expect that those
with higher ability aremore likely to find employment while waiting. In
other words, the lagged employment before the decision provides an
ideal proxy variable that captures unobserved factors that are associated
with a refugee’s latent employment potential. If omitted variable bias is a
concern, we should therefore see that the coefficient on the waiting pe-
riod goes to zero once we control for previous employment while
waiting. Models 3 to 11 in Table 1 show that this is clearly not the case.
Just as we would expect given that wait times are assigned by the SEM
independently of latent employment potential and that refugees cannot
sort around batch processing dates to influence their wait times within
the same week of arrival, the effect estimates of the waiting period are
almost identical, for example, 4.6 percentage points versus 4.8 percent-
age points when excluding or including 1 year of lagged employment
(model 3 versus model 4). This is despite the fact that previous employ-
ment is an extremely powerful predictor of postdecision employment;
for example, being employed in the year before the decision is associated
with a 48–percentage point increase in subsequent employment (model
4). The patterns are also similar with effect sizes between 15 and 31%
whenwe add the origin ×week of entry fixed effects and control for 1, 2,2 of 7
R E S EARCH ART I C L ETable 1. Longer asylum wait times lower the probability of subsequent employment for refugees. Regression coefficients with robust SEs in
parentheses. Outcome is measured as 100 for employed and 0 for not employed so that effects are in percentage points. All regressions include fixed
effects for gender, age, quarter of residency, religion, ethnicity, and canton. Models 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10 also include fixed effects for origin and week of
entry. Models 2, 5, 8, and 11 also include fixed effects for each origin × week of entry combination. Models 1 and 2 refer to all refugees. Models 3 to 5, 6 to
8, and 9 to 11 are restricted to refugees for which 1, 2, or 3 years are observed before the asylum decision, respectively.ModelHainmueller, Hangartner, Lawr1ence Sci. Ad2v. 2016; 2 : e1360043243 August 205166 7 8 9 10 11Outcome Employed (t)Sample mean 21.17 24.38 28.35 31.71Wait time (years) −4.87(1.18)
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ncem
ag.org/Fig. 1. Longer asylum wait times decrease the probability of subsequent employment for refugees, and this negative effect is stable across
elapsed wait times. Point estimates (black solid line) and 95% confidence intervals (blue ribbon) for the effect of a 1-year increase in the asylum wait time
on the probability of subsequent employment depending on howmanymonths a refugee has already waited for his or her asylum decision (n = 17,360) are
shown. Effect estimates basedon locallyweighted kernel regressionswith Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth, 2). Regressions control for gender, age, and fixed
effects for week of entry, origin, quarter of residency, religion, ethnicity, and canton. pp, percentage point.3 of 7
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 or 3 years of previous employment leading up to the decision (models 3
to 5, 5 to 8, and 9 to 11, respectively).
As an additional robustness check, we test whether the effect of the
wait times varies for refugees who have had a shorter or longer wait.
Figure 1 shows the effect of waiting one more year depending on the
elapsed wait time (based on a locally weighted kernel regression with
the same controls as the baseline model). We find that the negative
effect of longer wait times is remarkably stable for refugees who have
had a shorter or longer wait, with effect sizes ranging between 4 and
8 percentage points across the range of elapsed wait times. If anything,
the effect becomes more negative as refugees wait longer.
In the Supplementary Materials, we conduct further checks that
show that the results are robust regardless of whether we use a variety
of other fixed effects (see table S3) or exclude the canton fixed effects
(see table S4) and regardless of whether refugees appeal their asylum
decision (see table S5). We also find that the effects of waiting are sim-
ilar in cantons with more and less restrictive rules for labor market
access for asylum seekers (see table S6). Finally, we also estimate a
panel model with refugee and year fixed effects to estimate how the
effect of getting subsidiary protection status on employment varies
with the length of the waiting period. The results for this related quan-
tity of interest are very similar in that the positive effect of getting
subsidiary protection status on employment is reduced by about 3 per-
centage points for each additional year of waiting (see table S7). Over-
all, these checks show that the results are stable across elapsed wait
times, appeals, and more and less restrictive cantons, as well as when
controlling for up to 3 years of lagged employment, and are also
consistent when using an alternative panel identification strategy, un-
derscoring the robustness of the key findings.
Mechanisms
What mechanisms might account for the negative effect of waiting in
limbo?Twopossibilities are that the effect is drivenbya skill atrophymech-
anism (20) and psychological discouragementmechanisms (14–17). To
shed some light on which mechanism might be more important, we
now replicate the model for different subgroups of refugees stratified
by gender, origin, age at arrival, and assigned language region. If the ef-
fect ofwait times is drivenmainly by skill atrophy, that is, the depreciation
of occupational skills acquired through education, training, or job expe-
rience, then we expect to see varying effects for these refugee subgroups
because they vary considerably in their occupational skills and should
therefore be differently affected by the depreciation of these occupational
skills as a result of waiting. If instead the effect of waiting is mostly driven
by psychological mechanisms such as stress, depression, apathy, or low
motivation that arises from the prolonged uncertainty and idle waiting in
isolation, we expect a more similar effect given that these subgroups are
exposed to the same asylum conditions and that the core feelings asso-
ciated with stress and depression are typically thought to be universally
experienced (35). Figure 2 demonstrates that thedeleterious effect ofwait-
ing is remarkably stable across groups with only some variation (see table
S8 for the regression table). The only exception is that the effect is in-
significant for the subsamples of refugees from Asian origin countries.
Figure S4 and table S9 show that the effect of waiting is also similar
when we replicate the models for subgroups stratified by the length of
time the country of origin has been in conflict and levels of infant mor-
tality. Overall, this pattern is consistent with the idea that the effect of
wait time is mostly driven by psychological mechanisms, rather than
skill atrophy, but future work is needed to more precisely unpack theseHainmueller, Hangartner, Lawrence Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600432 3 August 2016mechanisms based on large-scale assessments of the refugees’ psycho-
logical well-being and their skill depreciation over time.DISCUSSION
Together, our results show that waiting longer in limbo for the asylum
decision strongly reduces the employment integration of refugees and
that this effect is fairly similar across subgroups. This new causal evi-
dence, which complements and advances existing qualitative research,
has important policy implications and suggests a practical mechanism
to improve economic integration of one of the world’s most vulnerable
and growing populations. Our analysis also suggests that simply
providing asylum seekers access to the labor market while waiting for
a decision is not sufficient to facilitate economic integration of refugees.
Althoughwe caution against extrapolating the results to extremely large
reforms of the asylum process because of potential general equilibrium
effects, our findings clearly suggest that policy reforms that marginally
reduce the waiting period for asylum seekers would help refugees to
navigate the difficult transition from a life in asylum limbo to a suc-
cessful integration into the host country. Moreover, these marginal re-
forms would increase employment and thereby reduce the significant
public expenditures for welfare benefits and increase the tax contribu-
tions of newly employed refugees [see the Supplementary Materials
for a marginal cost-benefit analysis that suggests that marginally re-
ducing wait times by only 10% (66 days) would lead to savings of about
$5.6 million in a single year alone]. Finally, better economic integration
of refugees will also likely help dampen the increasing native backlash
against refugees (7).
Although our study provides an important first step in enhancing
our understanding of how the asylum process causally affects refugee
integration, future research and more data are clearly needed to help
guide policy-makers who are struggling with the current and future re-
fugee crises. For example, we do not knowwhat the long-term effects of
wait times are or how other policy parameters, such as centralized ver-
sus decentralized housing, labor restrictions while waiting, or support
programs, affect refugee integration.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data
The data were provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and in-
cluded the refugees’ age, gender, country of origin, ethnicity, religion,
date of entry, date of the asylum decision, and information about
whether they were employed at the end of each year. Our use of these
data was governed by a data use agreement with the Swiss Federal Sta-
tistical Office and did not require informed consent and institutional
review board approval, given the nature of the data. These data enabled
us to remove biases fromunrepresentative samples, survey self-reporting,
and confounding that cannot be addressed with cross-sectional data. The
Supplementary Materials provide descriptive statistics and details on the
data and the Swiss asylum process, which is broadly similar to that of
European Union member states.
Empirical strategy
Figure 1 shows the average wait times by month of entry for refugees
from the top six origin countries. Even within the same origin group,4 of 7
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 Fig. 2. Longer asylum wait times decrease the probability of subsequent employment for various subgroups of refugees stratified by gender,
origin continent, age at arrival, and assigned language region. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of a 1-year increase in the
asylumwait time are shown. Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regressionwith robust SEs. Regressions include fixed effects for gender, age, week
of entry, origin, religion, ethnicity, canton, and quarter of residency. o
n
 August 30, 2016
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ag.org/Fig. 3. Wait times for asylumdecision vary by origin country andmonth of arrival. The averagewait times for the asylumdecision in days bymonth of
arrival for refugees from the top six sending countries.Hainmueller, Hangartner, Lawrence Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600432 3 August 2016 5 of 7
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 wait times varied by 179 days on average, from one month to the next.
Conditional on origin and time of arrival, the variation inwait timeswas
exogenous to the employment prospects of individual applicants. This
was because the SEM dictated the schedules for all hearings and
decisions; individual applicants could not simply speed up their
decisions. This feature primarily rules out self-selection from the side
of the applicants, which would be a concern if refugees who are more
motivated to integrate could speed up their wait times and were also
more likely to subsequently find employment.
Moreover, the SEM bases its decision solely on the legal criteria of
whether applicants require subsidiary protection and cannot be de-
ported back to their home country. This requires verifying the appli-
cants’ origin and the current conditions in their home country. To
deal with this task, the SEM caseworkers often processed applicants
from the same origin in batches once a certain number of similar cases
have accumulated. This stochastic batch processing is clearly visible in
the frequent spikes in the wait times in Fig. 3. Batch processing means
that otherwise similar applicants who happen to arrive on days right
before or right after a batch has been processed faced quite different
waiting periods simply because they got lucky or unlucky.
In table S10, we provide a test of these features and regress an appli-
cant’s own wait time on the average wait time of all the other applicants
who arrived from the same origin on the same day. We found that al-
most all of the variation in an applicant’s individual wait time was driv-
en by the average wait time of the other applicants who arrived on the
same day. This is what we would expect given that applications are pro-
cessed in batches based on origin and arrival dates and given that ap-
plicants cannot speed up their individual decisions.
Note that a variety of factors contribute to the quasi-random varia-
tion inwait times among refugeeswho arrive in Switzerland at a roughly
similar time. First, batch processing by the SEM does not follow a fixed
schedule that dictates that the batches are processed on a specific pre-
announced day or when a certain fixed threshold of cases is reached.
Instead, batch processing occurs haphazardly at irregular intervals, de-
pending on factors such as the workload of the caseworkers, howmany
cases have accumulated for specific origins, how conditions in the origin
country are changing, and other idiosyncratic factors. As a result, refu-
gees cannot a priori know the precise date at which a batch will be pro-
cessed and use this knowledge to time their day of arrival to fall just
before the date.
Second, fleeing to Switzerland typically involves a long and arduous
journey that is fraught with perils and unpredictability. For example,
refugees typically cannot precisely control when they will be driven
out of their homes; when smugglers will transport them across a border;
when their boats will be rescued or intercepted; when buses, trains, or
trucks will be available; when they will be stopped by police or border
agents; orwhen theywill runout ofmoney,water, food, or energy. Thus,
for the most part, whether refugees arrive in Switzerland a few days
earlier or later is simply beyond their precise control.
Third, because the SEM bases its decision solely on the legal criteria
of whether an applicant requires subsidiary protection, the employabil-
ity of asylum seekers or their potential employment while waiting does
not factor in to the asylum decision. In table S11, we conduct a placebo
check and regress thewait time on employment for up to 3 years before
the asylum decision. We found that all the coefficients on previous
employment were precisely estimated zeros, which demonstrated
that the employment record of refugees had no bearing on how long
they had to wait for a decision.Hainmueller, Hangartner, Lawrence Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600432 3 August 2016Econometric model
To estimate the impact of waiting in limbo, we used a baseline model
in which we regressed the indicator for postdecision employment on
the waiting period (measured in days divided by 365) and a large set
of control variables that included fixed effects for origin, the week of
entry, gender, age, quarters of residency, religion, ethnicity, and as-
signed canton such that the coefficient on the wait time was identified
only on the basis of within-group variation (overall, the baseline
model included 831 fixed effects). The quarter-of-residency fixed
effects were included to control for a potential residency effect. They
ensured that we identified the effect of wait times only based on var-
iation in wait times that occurred between refugees who had been re-
siding in Switzerland for the same total number of quarters. For
example, we compared two refugees who had been in Switzerland
for 2 years, but one of them waited 12 months for their asylum deci-
sion, whereas the other one waited 18 months.
To further exploit the batch processing of applications, we also
fitted a second model where we replaced the origin and week of entry
fixed effects with a full set of fixed effects for each of the 5054 observed
combinations of origin and week of entry (the within-group SD was
about 272 days on average). This specification considerably reduced
the degrees of freedom and was very conservative in that it further
restricted the identification to be only based on variation in wait times
that stemmed from differences in the day of entry among refugees
from the same origin who arrived in Switzerland in the same week.
For example, we compared a Somali refugee who arrived on Monday
or Tuesday in the first week of June 1999 with another Somali refugee
who was similar on all the covariates and arrived in the same week but
on Thursday or Friday.
Refugees who were similar on all the covariates and who arrived in
the same week were likely to be similar on unobserved characteristics,
and because the exact timing of batch processing was unknown to them
and they did not precisely control their day of arrival, we expected that
the refugees could not systematically sort around arrival days within a
given week to affect how long they would have to wait. For these rea-
sons, it is highly unlikely that the remaining variation in wait times is
confounded by latent employment prospects or other unobserved char-
acteristics that are correlated with subsequent employment. In other
words, it is highly unlikely that some systematic process exists, which
ensures that among observably similar refugees who arrive in the same
week, those with high employment prospects typically arrive right
before a batch will be processed, whereas those with low employment
prospects typically arrive right after the batch was processed.SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/2/8/e1600432/DC1
Supplementary Materials and Methods
Supplementary Results
fig. S1. Refugees and asylum seekers in European countries.
fig. S2. Composition of refugee population in European countries.
fig. S3. Composition of asylum seeker population in European countries.
fig. S4. Longer asylum wait times decrease the probability of subsequent employment for
various subgroups of refugees stratified by war duration and the level of infant mortality
from their origin country.
table S1. Asylum seeker labor market access.
table S2. Summary statistics.
table S3. Longer asylum wait times lower subsequent employment for refugees (controlling
for up to 3 years of previous employment and additional fixed effects).6 of 7
R E S EARCH ART I C L Etable S4. Results are robust to excluding the assigned canton as a control variable.
table S5. Effects of longer asylum wait times on subsequent employment are similar for
appellants and nonappellants (controlling for up to 3 years of previous employment).
table S6. Effects of longer asylum wait times on subsequent employment are similar in cantons
with 3 or 6 months of mandatory restrictions on labor market access (controlling for up to 3 years
of previous employment).
table S7. Longer asylum wait times lower the positive effect of getting subsidiary protection status
on employment (controlling in panel regression for person, year, and canton fixed effects).
table S8. Longer asylum wait times lower subsequent employment for various subgroups of
refugees stratified by gender, origin continent, age at arrival, and assigned language region.
table S9. Longer asylum wait times lower subsequent employment for various subgroups of
refugees stratified by war duration of the origin country and the origin infant mortality.
table S10. Because of batch processing, an applicant’s own wait time is primarily driven by the
average wait time for other refugees who arrive on the same day from the same origin.
table S11. Employment while waiting does not determine the wait time for the asylum decision.
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